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In this thesis, we address a new security problem in the realm of collaborating 
sensor networks. By collaborating sensor networks, we refer to the networks of sensor 
networks collaborating on a mission, with each sensor network is independently owned 
and operated by separate entities. Such networks are practical where a number of 
independent entities can deploy their own sensor networks in multi-national, commercial, 
and environmental scenarios, and some of these networks will integrate complementary 
functionalities for a mission. In the scenario, we address an authentication problem 
wherein the goal is for the Operator Oi of Sensor Network Si to correctly determine the 
number of active sensors in Network Si. Such a problem is challenging in collaborating 
sensor networks where other sensor networks, despite showing an intent to collaborate, 
may not be completely trustworthy and could compromise the authentication process. We 
propose two authentication protocols to address this problem. Our protocols rely on 
Physically Unclonable Functions, which are a hardware based authentication primitive 
exploiting inherent randomness in circuit fabrication. Our protocols are light-weight, 
energy efficient, and highly secure against a number of attacks. To the best of our 
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Symbol Description         
Oi  Operator of Sensor Network Si 
sk
i   Sensor sk belonging to the ith Sensor Network 
r   Query round 
Nr,k
i   Nonce shared between sensor ski and Oi for Round r 
Yk
i, Zk
i   Two secret keys shared between Sensor ski and Oi 
PUFk
i   Physically Unclonable Function of Sensor ski 
C(r,k)
i   Challenge Vector for Sensor ski in Round r 
A(r,k)
i   Authentication Challenge for Sensor ski in Round r 
PUFk
i(C(r,k)





1.1. INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEM 
Wireless Sensor Networks are proving to be indispensable technologies in many 
military and civilian settings. Practical necessities today both in military and civilian 
scenarios indicate that sensor networks in the near future will not be operating entirely 
independently, but will rather collaborate with peer networks owned and operated by 
other entities to collaborate on mission tasks. However, when missions involve multiple 
countries and/or commercial perspectives, complete trust between collaborating networks 
is not practical. Consider the following two scenarios: 
1.1.1. Multi-Country Scenario. There is an abundant amount of natural 
phenomena that can occur in which several countries are affected. Earthquakes can affect 
numerous regions across multiple countries, volcanic debris can cover hundreds of square 
miles, and tsunamis can reach entire coastlines. Detection of these events in order to 
provide advance warning and aid is significantly important to all the countries vulnerable 
to such a disaster, and by collaborating with nearby countries, larger sensor nets can be 
deployed to detect such phenomena as they form and occur at further distances. However, 
complete trust is improbable as each country will still also possess goals and agendas that 
may not necessarily be advantageous to the other collaborating countries (pollution and 
climate policies, etc.).   
1.1.2. A Commercial/Environmental Scenario. With commercial and 
environmental applications of sensor networks like soil monitoring, weather prediction, 
healthcare, etc., becoming feasible, there is an interest today in sensor-clouds [1, 2, 3, 4] 
where multiple independent sensor networks are integrated into a cloud framework 
providing services not possible with a single sensor network. It is likely that individual 
networks, from competing businesses and organizations may compromise overall 




1.2. PROBLEM ADDRESSED 
In this thesis, we address the following problem - Given n collaborating S1, S2, S3, 
…, Sn, how can the Operator Oi of Network Si correctly authenticate active sensors in its 
network.  
This problem is clearly unique to scenarios where multiple sensor networks 
collaborate, and is practical, since knowing which are active (i.e., functioning) sensors in 
its own network is critical for network operators. Note here that the solution to this 
problem is not trivial in the presence of other untrusted sensor networks. When Operator 
Oi of Network Si issues a query requesting sensors that are active in its network to report, 
sensors in another network Sj can masquerade as sensors in Network Si, packets can be 
dropped, corrupted, or replayed during forwarding, and malicious entities may also fake 
Oi.  
 
1.3. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS 
We propose two handshaking protocols to solve the above problem in this thesis. 
Our protocols rely on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs are circuits in 
hardware that provide hardware based authentication of a device. Briefly, given a 
challenge, a PUF circuit generates a verifiable response. The salient feature of the PUF 
design is that since their behavior is based on inherent randomness of physical hardware 
during fabrication, their behavior is not predictable before hand, nor is the behavior 
clonable. Depending on the hardware characteristics and physical property exploited like 
circuit delays, voltage values at power-up, ring oscillator frequencies, PUFs have been 
designed with a large number of challenge response pairs up to 264 with minimal 
increases in circuit overhead and latency [5]. Our protocols use a combination of PUF 
responses, XOR encryption and aggregation to address the authentication problem, while 




2.1. PRELIMINARIES OUTLINE 
In this section, we present important preliminaries related to our authentication 
problem and proposed protocols. In Section 2.1, we present the overall system model. 
The problem formulation is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses a number of 
attacks compromising the authentication problem. A brief overview of Physically 
Unclonable Functions, which form the core technology used in our authentication 
protocols, is presented next in Section 2.4.  
 
2.2. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this thesis, we are concerned with a network of independently operated but 
collaborating sensor networks. Figure 1 illustrates a simple case, where there are three 
sensor networks collaborating in a deployment field. Let us denote these sensor networks 
as S1, S2, S3. For illustration, let us assume that S1 is a network of temperature sensors, S2 
is a network of infra-red sensors, and S3 is a network of seismic sensors. These three 
sensor networks are independently owned and operated by O1, O2, and O3 respectively, 
and are expected to collaborate on the field, and communicate with each other. A 
practical application in this scenario is intruder sensing via fusing information from 
multiple sensors in multiple networks, despite each sensor network independently 
executing its own mission.  
All sensors are assumed to be static. A sensor in one network may use sensors in 
another network during routing. A sensor in one network may or not be interested in the 
information communicated by a sensor in another network. There is some key 
management scheme that is used by the sensors to protect their communications from 
eavesdropping by external adversaries. Since sensors can be faulty/ fail/ or be energy 
depleted, the number of active sensors in any network can change over time. Because of 
the collaborative nature of the sensor networks, each one is assumed to be able to read to 
some extent the messages sent by another sensor network. 
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2.3. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The problem we address in the above system model is the following. How can 
Operator Oi correctly determine which are the active sensors in its own Network Si 
whenever it wishes to. We can see from Figure 1, the number of sensors in Networks S1, 
S2, and S3 are 10, 12, and 8 respectively. However, as time goes on, sensors in a particular 
network may become faulty, may fail, or may be become energy depleted. If a significant 
number of sensors in a particular Network Si does become in-active, Operator Oi may 
desire to know this so that corrective action can be subsequently taken to mitigate 
network deficiency. Note that in practice, such a query from Oi will not arrive very often. 
It is expected to be generated over longer time intervals, or when Oi suspects any major 
change in the network state. 
 
2.4. ATTACKS COMPROMISING AUTHENTICATION 
Because of the collaboration with other sensor networks, there are two different 
sets of potential adversaries. The first type of adversary is the one who is external to all of 
the sensor networks. The second type of adversary is one that is part of the collaborative 
sensor network. This is an adversary who is also a friend, one whom a primary goal of 
accomplishing a given mission is shared, but there may also be a secondary goal of 
denying some amount of information to their collaborating partner or to learn secrets that 
were not meant to be shared.  
The external adversary can easily launch eavesdropping attacks at the sensor 
network in an attempt to learn secrets and vulnerabilities of the sensors and the network. 
They can also use masquerade and reflection attacks to trick sensors and / or the operator 
into revealing secrets and responses used in the authentication process. This attacker can 
also launch DOS, jamming, and routing attacks in an attempt to disrupt and deny 

















tamper with the sensor in an attempt to gain control or learn information from the sensor.  
 The allied adversary can launch all of the same attacks as the external adversary; 
however, the effectiveness of these attacks is much different due to level of access 
provided to this adversary. First, the allied adversary already have access to some 
information in the network such as types of sensors available, sensor IDs, sensor 
locations, etc. Second, because information is shared between sensors in the network, the 
allied adversary has an established manner of communication with the sensors of the 
operator's network that includes encryption keys necessary for preventing an external 
adversary from reading the sensor networks' communications. These two factors allow 
for the allied adversary to have a more effective attack for some attacks such as 
eavesdropping, masquerade, and reflection attacks. 
Since the goal is to securely authenticate sensors in the presence of an allied 
adversary and due to the elevated nature of the attacks that can be launched by an allied 
adversary, only the allied adversary will be considered during security analysis. 
 
2.5. PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS 
Our proposed solution to the authentication problem proposes leveraging 
Physically Unclonable Functions. We assume each sensor in a network is provisioned 
with its own Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). A PUF is an innovative circuit 
primitive that provides a mechanism to extract secrets leveraging from physical 
 
Figure 2.1 Three Collaborating Sensor Networks 
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randomness in hardware fabrication of integrated circuits (ICs) [11, 12, 13, 5, 14, 15]. 
More specifically, a PUF is a hardware primitive who behavior is determined by the 
physical structure of the hardware itself and its construction. The randomness of 
fabrication during circuit constructions makes no two circuits exactly the same. While a 
particular circuit exhibits repeatable behavior, predicting its performance before hand is 
not possible, and cloning of the circuit is highly impractical. Typically, PUFs are used in 
a challenge-response mechanism, wherein given a Challenge C, the PUF for a particular 
device will respond with a Response R. While R is repeatable for the same C, guessing or 
cloning the circuit to derive R is not possible hence providing a straightforward 
mechanism for hardware based authentication. 
A number of properties of ICs today lend themselves to creating PUFs. An 
Optical PUF can be generated as a result of speckle patterns (intensity patterns produced 
by the mutual interference of a set of wave fronts) emanated when a laser beam shines on 
an optical material [16]. These patterns are random, unique, and unclonable, hence 
realizing an optical physically unclonable, hence realizing an optical PUF. Another type 
of PUF is called a Coating based PUF, where above a normal IC, a network of metal 
wires is laid out in a comb shape. The space between and above the comb structure is 
filled with an opaque material and randomly doped with dielectric particles. Because of 
the random placement, size, and dielectric strength of the particles, the capacitance 
between each couple of metal wires will be random up to a certain extent. A number of 
PUFs exploiting other physical properties that exhibit randomness during circuit 
fabrications have been designed exploiting inherent randomness during circuit 
fabrications. These include delay based PUF exploits random variations in delays of 
wires and gates on silicon [11, 12], oscillator frequencies [11, 13, 5], voltage values 















Optical PUF [11, 12]  105 1ms  
Delay based  Arbiter 
[11, 12] 
450 264 5ns 0.239pJ 
Ring Frequency  
Oscillator [11, 13, 5] 
1159 496 1650ns 244.2pJ 
SRAM Voltage based 
PUF [14, 15] 
256 250 11ns  
 
 
With advances in hardware miniaturization, PUFs are becoming increasingly 
practical, with minimal overhead in space and energy expenditure. For instance, it is 
estimated that implementing a delay circuit requires about 6 to 8 gates for each input bit, 
and oscillating counter circuit that measures delay requires about 33 gates. Therefore, a 
64-bit input delay PUF requires only about 545 gates [5]. A typical coating PUF has been 
implemented in [17] with just 1000 gates, and the optical PUF implemented in [16] can 
yield upto 10^6 challenge-response pairs with a delay of around 1 ms per authentication. 
The use of 256 SRAM blocks has been shown to yield 100 bits of true randomness each 
time the memory is powered up [15]. Note that the reliance on PUFS on subtle inherent 
physical variations during fabrication means that they are inherently sensitive to physical 
tampering [18, 19, 13, 20], and can be easily detected with incorrectly received responses 






3. OUR BASIC 3-WAY HANDSHAKING PROTOCOL 
3.1. PROTCOL INTRODUCTION 
We now present our basic 3-way handshaking protocol for authentication in 
collaborating sensor networks. We first present the description of the protocol, followed 
by an analysis on the security performance against attacks. We also assume that the total 
number of active sensors in Network S is m. 
 
3.2. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
Protocol 1 presents our basic 3-way handshaking protocol. The protocol is 
executed each time (or round) when the Operator Oi intends to authenticate sensors 
belonging to network Si. Consider an arbitrary Round r. Operator Oi will broadcast a 





















































where N(r,k)i is a nonce shared between Operator Oi and Sensor ski. Once a sensor ski 
verifies that the nonce received is expected, it proceeds with the following steps. 
Otherwise, the message is discarded. Note that the nonce for the first round is pre-stored 
on sensor ski. This completes the first part of the handshaking protocol. Using its secret 
keys pre-distributed keys Yki and Zki, sensor ski extracts two challenges C(r,k)i and A(r,k)i. 
Here C(r,k)i denotes the challenge issued by the operator whose response from ski will then 
be used to authenticate it, while A(r,k)i denotes the subsequent challenge whose response 
from Oi will enable sensor ski verify that its response was indeed received by Oi correctly. 
Once a sensor ski extracts C(r,k)i, it will compute a Response P(r,k)i which is the output of 
the sensor’s physically unclonable function, i.e., P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i). This response 
along with the sensor ID is then routed back to Operator Oi as [ski || P(r,k)i ⊕  Yki]. This 
completes the second part of the handshaking protocol.  
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Once Operator Oi receives responses (after a tolerable delay), it will verify if the 
received P(r,k)i  is the expected one for Sensor ski. For every sensor whose response was 
correctly authenticated, the operator will derive Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i). For any sensor sji 
whose response cannot be verified as correct, Q(r,j)i is set to a random bit string. This 
prevents any attackers targeting the unverified node to learn any information about the 
protocol by the absence of a message or data value. Operator Oi will broadcast this 
response to all sensors in the network in order to convince sensors receipt of their 























































Each sensor ski can now verify if its message was indeed received correctly by 
verifying the correctness of Q(r,k)i, based on the challenge A(r,k)i that it already possesses. 
Each sensor will also be able to successfully extract the expected Nonce N(r+1,k)i for the 
next round r + 1. If Q(r,k)i for sensor ski is not the expected value, this means that Oi did 
not receive the sensor’s response due to possible packet drop or corruption enroute. 
Hence Sensor ski will send its original P(r,k)i via multiple routing paths to the operator 
expecting an acknowledgement. If an acknowledgement from Oi still does not arrive, the 
sensor can practically consider itself in-active due to a broken communication link with 
the operator. This completes the 3-way handshaking protocol.  
 
3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
In this section, we present a security analysis of Protocol 1 against attacks 
discussed in Section 2.3. 
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3.3.1. Eavesdropping Attacks. The attacker can eavesdrop on any 
communication in the network. However, the adversary will not be able to infer any 
information that could compromise the authentication process. By observing the PUF 
responses P(r,k)i of sensor ski in Round r, the adversary will not be able to infer  anything 
useful about the current or subsequent communication since PUF responses cannot be 
predicted in advance or cloned. Note that it may be possible that the adversary may infer 
the number of sensors belonging to a network by observing the number of responses. 
Such an attack can be easily thwarted if Operator O introduces dummy entries in its 
queries, and if sensors send dummy message during query responses. Dummy queries 
will not be processed, while dummy responses from sensors will be identified by the 
operator and discarded. The downside though may be increased overhead during the 
messages forwarding.  
Also, an eavesdropping adversary may capture messages from the operator. 
However, since messages are encrypted using secret keys Yki and Zki for sensor ski, the 
adversary will not be able to infer Challenges C(r,k)i or A(r,k)i for Round r (Step 1). 
Similarly, the adversary can eavesdrop on the response message of the operator for 
Round r (Step 19). The adversary could then attempt to discover information by 
observing the plain text nonce in the next round. First, the adversary will not be able to 
infer N(r+1,k)i for Sensor ski from any passive observations in Round r due to encryption. 
Also, by performing operations Q(r,k)i ⊕ Yki ⊕ Q(r,k)i ⊕ N(r+1,k)i ⊕ Zki ⊕ N(r+1,k)i, the 
adversary will only be able to infer Yki ⊕ Zki, which itself yields no useful information 
about the keys stored. 
3.3.2. Masquerading Attacks. Attackers may impersonate sensors in the network 
during querying. However, a masquerading sensor will not be to generate the correct PUF 
response. Such messages will be identified as fake by the operator and discarded 
automatically. Note that since PUFs cannot be cloned due to their inherent randomness 







 Protocol 1 Basic 3-way Handshaking Protocol in Round r 
 



















































2: End 1-way handshake 
3: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps 
4: IF  N(r,k)i  is as expected 
5:  Extract C(r,k)i  and A(r,k)i 
6: Compute P(r,k)i= PUFki(C(r,k)i) 
7: ski sends [ski || P(r,k)i] to Oi  
8: ELSE Reject Request 
9: END IF 
10: End 2-way handshake  
11: Operator Oi executes the following steps for each Sensor ski 
12: IF  received P(r,k)i matches expected response 
13:      Authenticated Sensor ski as Active 
14:  Compute Q(r,k)i  = PUFki(A(r,k)i) 
15: ELSE  
16: Consider Sensor ski as Inactive 
17:  Set Q(r,k)i = Random bit string 
18: END IF 




















































20: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps 
21: IF  Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i) 
22:  Extract Nonce N(r+1,1)i for Round r + 1 
23: ELSE Send P(r,k)i  to Oi via multiple routing paths 
24: END IF 




3.3.3. Reflection Attacks. Reflection attacks are not a threat to the authentication 
process in Protocol 1, since the challenges and response of sensors and the operator are 
different. Sensors will respond with the PUF value only upon correctly verifying the 
nonce from the operator which are not exposed to the adversary. Similarly the adversary 
will never gain knowledge of, or generate the PUF value that can be used for a 
subsequent authentication process. Even if the adversary captures the PUF response for a 
challenge, the same challenge is very unlikely to be used again for sufficiently long 
challenge bit sequences. As pointed earlier in Table 2, up to 264 challenge-responses are 
feasible with PUFs today. Hence reflection attacks are addressed in Protocol 1.  
3.3.4. Packet Drop/ Packet Corruption Attacks. In a network of collaborating 
sensor networks, any of the messages sent by the operator or the sensor may travel 
through sensors belonging to other networks. In this scenario the message may be 
dropped, potentially disrupting the authentication process. This can be easily detected 
because, at each phase of the protocol, a message is expected by either the operator or the 
sensor. If that message does not arrive, the sensor and/or operator can resend its previous 
message with or without modifications to the routing path until a set number of retry 
attempts is met, at which point the sensor can be considered inactive due to the inability 
to successfully communicate with the sensor. The same responses and consequences will 
also be used if a packet corruption attack is used instead. In either case, this does not 
compromise the correctness of Protocol 1. These attacks are similar to a denial of service 
attack except that instead targeting the sensor, the routing path is targeted. 
3.3.5. Replay and Selective Forwarding Attacks. Replay and Selective 
Forwarding attacks can be launched by other malicious sensors that have eavesdropped 
on previous packets. However, since the PUF responses are unique to every challenge, 
there is no incentive for adversaries to launch such attacks. An adversary that attempts to 
launch replay or selective forwarding attacks will be ignored by the sensors, since the 
expected nonce will never match. The energy consumed for comparing a sequence of bits 
is very minimal in sensors. Furthermore, if repeated replay and selective fowarding 
attacks are launched, it is easy for sensors to detect the presence of an adversary and 
notify the operator who can then take other corrective actions. 
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3.3.6. Denial of Service Attacks. In the event that attackers are able to jam one or 
more sensors in the network, their responses will not be able to reach the operator. As 
long as a jamming attack continues, the sensor being jammed is practically useless, and 
hence it will not be considered as an active sensor by the operator.  
3.3.7. Physical Attacks. As pointed earlier in the section, PUFs provide an 
inherent resilience against physical tampering [18, 19, 13, 20]. When adversaries 
physically tamper with sensors, the physical characteristics of the circuit will be altered, 
and the PUF responses to challenges will also be altered. Upon receiving incorrect PUF 
responses to challenges, the operator will subsequently identify a physically tampered 
sensor as inactive. 
As shown, our protocol is highly resilient against a variety of attacks. While some 
of the attacks can disrupt and block communications with a given sensor, the allied 
adversary is still unable to break the authentication protocol outlined above. This also 
holds true for an external adversary since their attacks will not have the level of access 




4. OUR AGGREGATED 3-WAY HANDSHAKING PROTOCOL 
4.1. PROTOCOL INTRODUCTION 
Our basic 3-way handshaking protocol presented above is robust against a number 
of attacks compromising authentication in collaborating sensor networks. However, the 
major limitation of Protocol 1 is that each sensor individually forwards its response to the 
operator. This will introduce significant communication overhead in large scale networks, 
which our proposed 3-way Aggregated Protocol described below alleviates without 
compromising security performance. We also assume that the total number of active 
sensors in Network Si is m. 
 
4.2. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
Protocol 2 presents our aggregated 3-way handshaking protocol. This protocol 
considers a sensor network clustered into a certain number of clusters. Each sensor 
belongs to one cluster with a cluster-head. The operator is assumed to know which sensor 
belongs to which cluster, which could be known just after deployment as sensors generate 
clusters among themselves using techniques in [21, 22]. Protocol 2 is executed each time 
(or round) when the Operator Oi intends to authenticate sensors belonging to network Si. 
Consider an arbitrary Round r. The operator will broadcast a query vector containing the 
nonce and encrypted challenge vectors for each sensor. This completes the first part of 
the handshaking protocol.  
After computing the PUF response P(r,k)i = PUFki(C(r,k)i), each sensor will forward 
its response to its cluster-head. Consider Cluster j for illustration. The cluster-head will 
aggregate all responses in its cluster using the XOR function to compute G(r,j)i for Cluster 
j. It will then broadcast G(r,j)i and responding sensor IDs to its upstream cluster-head and 
all sensors in its cluster. The upstream cluster-head will once again perform aggregation 
and this process continues towards the operator. Each sensor in Cluster j will store G(r,j)i 
for subsequent verification in the event of a packet corruption. This completes the second 
part of the handshaking protocol.
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  Protocol 2 Aggregated 3-way Handshaking Protocol in Round r 
 



















































3: End 1-way handshake 
4: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps 
5: IF N(r,1)i  is as expected  
6:  IF  Sensor ski is a NOT a Cluster-Head  
7:        Extract C(r,k)i  and A(r,k)i 
8:       Compute P(r,k)i  = PUFki(C(r,k)i) 
9:       ski [ski || P(r,k)i] Cluster-Head 
10: ELSE IF  Sensor ski is a Cluster-Head of Cluster j 
11:            Extract C(r,k)i and A(r,k)i 
12:       Compute P(r,k)i  = PUFki(C(r,k)i) 
13:           Compute G(r,j)i = P(r,k)i ⊕ P(r,j)i ∀ responding sensors sji  in Cluster j 
14:       Forward G(r,j)i, Sensor IDs to Peer Sensors and Upstream Cluster-
Head 
15: END IF 
16: ELSE Reject Request 
17: END IF 
18: End 2-way handshake 
19: Operator Oi executes the following steps for each Sensor ski 
20: Compute ∀ responding sensors ski, ⊕ P(r,k)i 
21: IF  Response matches Expected Response 
22:   Authenticated All Sensor IDs received as Active 
23:  Compute Q(r,k)i = PUFki(A(r,k)i) 
24: ELSE     % malicious behavior detected 
25: Operator computes ∀ responding sensors ski in Cluster j, G(r,j)i  = ⊕ P(r,k)i 






























27: FOR  Each Cluster j in the Network 
28:           FOR  Each sensor ski in Cluster j 
29:   Report P(r,k)i  = PUFki(C(r,k)i) to Operator  
30:           END FOR 
31: END FOR 
32: Operator can identify malicious sensors and consider them inactive 
33: Operator sets Q(r,k)i = Random bit string ∀ inactive sensors ski 
 














Upon receiving the aggregated response and all responding sensor ids, the 
operator will compute ⊕ P(r,k)i for responding sensors ski. If this value matches the 
aggregated response received from the immediate downstream cluster-head(s), the 
authentication process is completed and all responding sensors are considered active. 
Otherwise, at least one or more sensors generated a malicious response or an 
intermediary malicious sensor processed a packet and corrupted it. In either case, the 
operator will broadcast the expected aggregated responses to each cluster. When a sensor 
receives G(r,j)i from the operator for its cluster, it will compare the correctness of its own 
aggregated response that was forwarded to it by its own cluster-head. If the compared 
values match, then there was no malicious sensor in its cluster and the sensor ignores the 
message. If on the other hand, the compared values do not match, then the sensors in the 
cluster will send their individual responses to the operator and the operator can now 
detect the malicious response, since the sensor that was the source of the malicious 
behavior will not be able to generate the correct PUF response. Similarly, corruptions of 
packets by intermediate sensors can also be detected. After this step, all active sensors 
will be correctly authenticated and the operator will send an authentication response 
along with an encrypted form of the nonce to be used for the next round of 
authentication. This completes the 3-way handshaking protocol.  
 
Protocol 2 Continued 
 
33: Operator sets Q(r,k)i = Random bit string ∀ inactive sensors ski 
34: END IF 




















































36: Each Sensor ski executes the following steps 
37: IF  Q(r,k)i  = PUFki(A(r,k)i) 
38:  Extract Nonce N(r+1, 1)i  for Round r + 1 
39: ELSE Send P(r,k)i  to Operator via multiple routing paths 
40: END IF 
41: End 3-way handshake 
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4.3. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
Because of the similarities to Protocol 1, Protocol 2 and Protocol 1 share many of 
the same security properties. Their defense against eavesdropping, reflection, DOS, and 
physical attacks are the same in every respect except the time frame in which the attack 
can occur. This occurs because the aggregation process requires an additional amount of 
time that is missing from Protocol 1. Assuming that the networks are the same, Protocol 2 
will usually take longer than Protocol 1.  
4.3.1. Replay, Selective Forwarding, Packet Drop and Corruption Attacks. 
These attacks gain a slight advantage in Protocol 2 due to the increase in the number of 
message transmissions. Each of these attacks requires manipulating a target packet via 
duplication, denial, or corruption, and so any increase in the number of packets being sent 
in a protocol automatically increases the number of viable targets that these attacks can 
be initiated on. In Protocol 2, 2 new message exchanges are introduced: the request for 
specific PUF responses when a malicious node is detected and the subsequent reply. Both 
of these messages can be targeted by the adversary. Unfortunately, that is the only 
advantage that the adversary gains. The results of these attacks will be the same as in 
Protocol 1 due to the packets being resent along different routes in the case of selective 
forwarding and packet drop attacks and the requirement of a particular PUF response 
during this exchange in the case of packet corruption and replay attacks. 
4.3.2. Masquerade Attacks. The advantage gained by a masquerade attack is the 
same as for the replay, selective forwarding, packet drop and corruption attacks as 
described above: because of the increase in message exchanges, more opportunities are 
available for the masquerading node to initiate an attack. But again, the attack is still 
thwarted by the requirement of specific PUF responses that a masquerading node cannot 
reproduce.  
As shown, even with providing additional opportunities for an adversary to attack, 
Protocol 2 is still resilient to a variety of attacks. There is the vulnerability to having 
communications disrupted and blocked completely as mentioned in Protocol 1, but this 




4.4. DISCUSIONS OF IMPROVING SCALABILITY AND MALICIOUS SENSOR 
IDENTICATION 
Currently, when a single, aggregated response is returned to the operator 
containing a malicious response, the entire cluster tree is queried to identify the exact 
sensors that have been compromised. This introduces considerable overhead into the 
network and also provides more opportunities for the adversary to compromise the 
authentication process by targeting the messages being transmitted. By modifying how 
the PUF responses are XOR’ed together, malicious sensors can be detected before steps 
25 – 32 and / or reduce the number of potentially compromised nodes that must be 
checked. Instead of ⊕ all P(r,k)i, each cluster head ⊕ its P(r,k)i with each received response 
and then forwards this group response to the upstream cluster head. This results in each 
leaf sensor being ⊕ with all its cluster heads in its tree branch. Additionally, each cluster 
head can be uniquely identified by its sensor groupings. This allows for the operator to 
identify where in the sensor network a malicious response was inserted, reducing the 
number of sensors that must be queried if a cluster head is compromised and providing 
immediate detection of compromised leaf sensors. The scalability of the network is also 
improved as this greatly reduces the communication overhead that would be incurred 
from querying entire cluster branches and improves detection as more leaf sensors and 
cluster heads are added. The only downside to this fix is that the base communication 





In this thesis, we addressed the problem of authentication in collaborating sensor 
networks. Our protocols are based on Physically Unclonable Functions, an innovative 
circuit primitive that provides a mechanism to extract secrets leveraging from physical 
randomness in hardware fabrication of integrated circuits (ICs). Our protocols are light-
weight, efficient, correct and highly resilient to a variety of attacks. Addressing other 
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